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Atheism: Young Hegelian Style
 
 Andrew Levine
 For roughly a decade following the death in 1833 of Germany’s and the world’s 
leading philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a handful of students and 
young professors in Berlin set out to advance the cause of revolution in Germany 
by extending Hegel’s ideas and by launching a “critique” of contemporaneous 
(“Right Hegelian”) Protestant theology.  These Young (or “Left”) Hegealians 
included David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Karl Neuwerck, Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold 
Ruge, Max Stirner, Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx; as remarkable a group of 
fledgling thinkers as ever joined together in a common project.
 Their rationale, the methods they deployed, and the substantive views they 
advanced seem exotic today, a relic of a long gone moment in German thought.1
Nevertheless, from roughly the 1950s through the 1980s, Marxists in Western 
countries took a keen interest in Young Hegelianism because they saw Marx’s 
early, Young Hegelian writings as key to developing a “humanistic” version of 
Marxism.  More recently, with interest in Marx and Marxism on the wane, interest 
in Young Hegelianism has subsided accordingly.  This is unfortunate because 
what we can still learn from Feuerbach and the others is, if anything, even more 
timely and urgent than ever.
 I will dwell no more on the movement’s history or its internal divisions than 
I must in order to convey a sense of what it was about in its own time and place. 
Following ample precedent, I will assume that Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity 
was, at once, the movement’s seminal work and crowning achievement.  Because 
Feuerbach influenced Marx, and because Young Hegelianism is inevitably viewed 
through a Marxian prism, this is a standard, though contestable, position.  But 
even if Feuerbach’s place in the Young Hegelian movement was less central than 
it seems to those interested more in Marx than the others, the fact remains: for 
most purposes, it is Feuerbach’s masterwork that merits the most attention.
 For contemporary readers, The Essence of Christianity can seem a strange 
collation. This is hardly surprising: it is an intervention into philosophical and 
political debates that faded into obscurity long ago.  Fortunately, however, this 
is an instance where, as it were, God is not in the details.  This is why the details 
can, for the most part, be passed over or set aside.  My aim today is just to sketch 
a different kind of atheism, atheism Young Hegelian style, from the kind with 
which most people are familiar.
 In the Young Hegelian view, what might be called standard atheism was 
“completed” in the eighteenth century.  The Young Hegelians were therefore not 
interested in rebutting arguments purporting to establish the rationality of belief 
in God ; they regarded that work as already done.  Neither were they interested 
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directly in other aspects of so-called “rational theology.”  Rather, they took it 
for granted that none of it meets rational standards for belief acceptance.  The 
Young Hegelians, along with many others, credited “materialist” philosophers 
with securing rational theology’s demise.  It should be noted, however, that 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), an idealist philosopher and also a believer, played, 
if anything, a more decisive role.  Nevertheless, for reasons having to do both 
with the appeal of theistic convictions and with the nature of philosophy itself, 
rational theology refuses to die.  I would venture, though, that the Young Hegelians 
were right — that the end of “rational theology” is long past due.  In reflecting 
on their version of atheism, I will therefore follow their lead by not dwelling on 
issues they regarded as established beyond any reasonable doubt.
  * * *
 Feuerbach had two related aims: to develop a “philosophical anthropology” 
or, what comes to the same thing in his thinking, an account of the human 
essence; and to explain theism in anthropological terms  — revealing the human 
(anthropological) meaning that belief in God both expresses and conceals. 
Feuerbach also sought to uncover the human meanings of concepts that cluster 
around the God idea, for which the concept of God is foundational.  Criticism is 
the methodology Feuerbach devised for these purposes.  It is a “hermeneutical” 
or interpretive program.  Specifically, it is a “translation” program that aims at 
what would nowadays be called a “theoretical reduction” — in which one theory 
is recast or translated into another more fundamental theory.  In The Essence of 
Christianity, Feuerbach’s aim was to translate Right Hegelian Protestant theology, 
which he regarded as the most developed “theory” of religious experience, into 
Young (Left) Hegelian philosophical anthropology, a “theory” he considered 
fundamental for reasons I will discuss presently.  However, unlike an ordinary 
translation, Feuerbach’s “critique” of Protestant theology does not just identify 
equivalences between terms; it “reduces” away and therefore eliminates one of the 
theories, the theological one, by translating it into the other, the philosophical 
anthropology.  The Young Hegelians thought that reducing a theory away, 
eliminating it, is tantamount to reducing away what it represents, eliminating 
the theory’s “object” as well.
 As remarked, Feuerbach had no reason to restate what he took to be timeworn 
rebuttals of Christianity’s claims.  He assumed standard atheism.  But there is a 
sense in which he supposed that rational theology’s (literally false) claims are true 
— inasmuch as they express something real.  The problem, though, is that they 
misrepresent the truths they express.  Translating them into a true philosophical 
anthropology sets these misrepresentations right.  Thus Feuerbach took up the 
preceding century’s efforts to throw off Christianity’s yoke not by showing that 
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its main contentions are wrong but by uncovering the human meanings they 
conceal.  His was therefore a more radical atheism than the one his predecessors 
had established; an atheism that, fully grasped, would set humanity on a course 
free from the thrall of beliefs that are not only false, but also, for reasons I will 
next discuss, retrograde and oppressive.
 It seems remarkable today that, by their own lights, Feuerbach and the others 
were embarked on an emancipatory project that brings philosophy’s history, as 
they conceived it, to an end — melding it into revolutionary politics.  But that 
was indeed the case.  The Young Hegelians developed their account of their own 
role in German politics and philosophy by drawing on Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Mind (Geist), published in 1807, and from the material published posthumously 
in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History and in his Lectures on The History of 
Philosophy.  A particular conception of philosophy emerges from their reflections 
on these texts.  It is a conception that emphasizes, and arguably exaggerates, 
Hegel’s importance, and therefore the importance of his followers, including 
themselves.  Hardly anyone today would endorse the story the Young Hegelians 
assumed without qualifying it substantially.  Nevertheless, the Young Hegelians’ 
view of what philosophers do, or rather of what they ought to do, is widely shared. 
For them, as for most philosophers nowadays, philosophy is not so much about 
doctrines as about resolutions of puzzlements of a broadly conceptual nature. 
Among the things philosophers do to this end is construct theories, accounts 
guided by rational standards, of general and abstract things — for example, 
goodness and beauty and the nature of the real.  Of course, these theories can 
be considered doctrines.  But not all collections of doctrines are philosophies. 
Bodies of doctrine exist nearly everywhere and at all times.  But philosophy’s way 
of making sense of the world, its project as it were, has a determinate history — a 
beginning, a middle, and an end.  It began in ancient Greece and then developed, 
over two thousand years, in fits and starts until it was begun again, definitively 
and for the final time, in seventeenth century Europe.  Philosophy’s last new 
beginning is epitomized in the work of magisterial philosophers of whom René 
Descartes (1596-1650) was, by far, the most influential.
 This “moment” in philosophy’s history culminated in the late eighteenth 
century, in Germany, in the work of Immanuel Kant.  Needless to say, Hegel and 
his followers did not maintain that Kant “solved” all the problems that philosophers 
had posed since Socrates.  Their idea, instead, was that, after Descartes and the 
others had reconceived philosophy, making the forms and limits of knowledge 
its principal concern, efforts to defend or combat skepticism became Topic A. 
In Hegel’s view, Kant finally defeated skepticism by showing how knowledge of 
“the external world” is possible.  In doing so, he also made clear what the entire 
philosophical project, from its beginnings to his own day, had been about.  It was 
about Freedom, an idea that worked its way to full self-consciousness through 
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the unfolding of real history and its philosophical representations.
  Kant distinguished the actual world human beings experience, a phenomenal 
order that exists in space and time and that is governed by the principle of 
causality, from the real or noumenal order of things-in-themselves.  He argued 
that we can establish that things-in-themselves, noumenal things, exist, but that 
knowledge of them must remain forever beyond our grasp.  This separation of 
the actual from the real, where the former is cognitively accessible and the latter 
is not, gave rise to a new set of problems, the resolution of which was the task 
of “classical German philosophy.”  In order to join the actual and the real in 
the way he ultimately did, it fell to Hegel to represent the structure of what is, 
of reality itself.  Ultimately, he did so by identifying the Real with the Rational; 
in other words, with Reason itself.
 This line of reasoning led Hegel to maintain that reality is dialectical in the 
sense that its constituent subjects and objects interact with and thereby transform 
one another.  For as long as the dialectic unfolds, the real is in a process of becoming 
— in which, on Hegel’s account, what is, an affirmation or thesis, develops its own 
negation or antithesis with which it is in internal opposition or contradiction, until 
its contradictory “moments” are incorporated into a higher unity, a synthesis or 
supersession (Aufhebung).
 Equipped with this understanding, Hegel came to the view that the Kantian 
idea of freedom is an essentially historical notion.  Following his lead, all of 
Hegel’s followers, Right and Left, agreed that, ultimately, freedom can and must 
be realized in actual history.  Both sides also agreed that this “end” or culmination 
of classical German philosophy is attained when the Kantian idea of Freedom 
is embodied institutionally in a state organized around principles of universal 
Right (Recht), a Rechtstaat.  Their quarrel was therefore not so much philosophical 
as political.  For the Right Hegelians, Prussia was already a Rechtstaat.  The 
Right Hegelians were therefore defenders of their own regime’s status quo and 
opponents of revolutionary efforts to overthrow it.  However, for the Young (Left) 
Hegelians, the Prussian state was the penultimate, not the final, “moment” in 
Freedom’s career.  This is why, as its dialectical trajectory unfolds, it “inverts” 
the real; intensifying unfreedom to its maximum point.  Accordingly, the task 
is precisely to overthrow that state — putting Reason finally in control of the 
political realm.
 The Young Hegelians thought that their Right Hegelian rivals misconceived 
the end point of the project Hegel theorized because, like Hegel, they were 
idealists, not materialists.  Correcting that mistake was a task the Young Hegelians 
took upon themselves.  They sought to provide the Hegelian dialectic with the 
materialist foundations it lacks.
 As remarked, when Descartes and the others relaunched the philosophical 
project in the seventeenth century, they put the question “What can I know?” in 
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the foreground.  Their guiding idea was that what is is what we can know to be 
the case; neither more nor less.  With this conviction in place, Descartes went 
on to show, at least to his own satisfaction, that there are two kinds of things we 
can know to be, two substances: ideal substance, Mind; and material substance, 
Matter.  The former is mental (thinking is its essence) and therefore non-spatial; 
the latter is spatial (extension is its essence) and therefore mind-independent. 
Thus, even if it is fair to say that Descartes started philosophy anew, it is plain 
that he drew on the thinking of his predecessors.  It was from them that he got 
the category of substance.  Substances, in the “scholastic” tradition Descartes’ 
thinking emerged out of, are, among other things, radically independent of one 
another.  Because he adopted their conception, incorporating it into his own 
metaphysical reflections, Descartes’ account of what is raised a momentous 
question: how can the two substances he identified, Mind and Matter, interact? 
They plainly do in each and every one of us; our bodies and minds affect one 
another.  But how is this possible?
 Descartes proposed a patently unsatisfactory solution to the so-called mind-
body problem.  So did others who followed in his wake.  But it soon became 
the consensus view that, to make sense of mind-body interactions and of other 
problems generated by the preeminence modern (post-Cartesian) philosophy 
accords to theories of knowledge, there must ultimately be only one substance. 
Mind and Matter, conceived Descartes’ way, were the contenders.  Those who 
maintained that everything that is, including ostensibly material things like physical 
objects, are ultimately mental in nature were idealists; those who maintained 
that everything, including ostensibly mental things like pains or sensations, are 
ultimately comprised of matter were materialists.
 Kant and Hegel were idealists, as were many of their celebrated predecessors, 
but there were materialist philosophers too, especially in eighteenth century France. 
These were the philosophers who took it upon themselves to refute belief in God. 
Partly for this reason, materialism came to be identified with atheism.  Because 
so much revolutionary activity in those days was directed against ecclesiastical 
authorities, and because atheists were anti-clerical, materialism also became 
associated with revolutionary politics.  Correspondingly, idealism was associated 
with theism and conservative or even reactionary politics.  There were exceptions, 
of course, but the idea that these metaphysical, theological and political positions 
were connected — not just for contingent historical reasons, but for conceptual 
reasons as well — was a tenet of the intellectual culture the Young Hegelians 
inhabited.  It had been so for decades before Young Hegelianism erupted on the 
scene, and it would remain so throughout the nineteenth century and even into 
the twentieth century, thanks to orthodox Marxism and later Communism.  Thus 
it was not only philosophical considerations that led the Young Hegelians to seek 
to recast the Hegelian dialectic on materialist foundations.  Their motivations 
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were political as well.
 By his own account, Feuerbach was a proponent of Hegel’s dialectical method 
but also, as a materialist, an opponent of Hegel’s idealist ontology.  In all likelihood, 
Hegel would have deemed this configuration of positions incoherent; Feuerbach’s 
Right Hegelian opponents certainly did.  But the Young Hegelians were adamant. 
How successful they were, however, in forging a genuinely dialectical materialism 
is another matter.  The feasibility of that project remains controversial to this 
day.
 Feuerbach also differed from Hegel on other key issues.  Hegel’s philosophy 
was about abstract, historical processes; not about Man (sic) or any other historical 
“subject.”  In marked contrast, Feuerbach’s philosophy was precisely about 
human subjectivity; it was a “philosophical anthropology,” a theory of what 
human beings are.  However Feuerbach was no naturalist; his philosophical 
anthropology took no account of universal psychological properties, or anything 
else susceptible to empirical investigation.  It was metaphysical and essentialist. 
Feuerbach thought that the way to account for what human beings are is to identify 
essential metaphysical (non-natural) properties pertinent to the human subject. 
He deemed this project fundamental.  If he was right, philosophy ultimately 
just is philosophical anthropology in the sense that the questions posed within 
classical German philosophy, philosophy’s final stage, are, in the final analysis, 
about what Man essentially is.
 The idea that there is a human essence — that there are essential, as opposed to 
merely accidental properties of human beings — is itself a metaphysical contention. 
It is therefore not equivalent to the claim that, as a matter of fact, there are traits 
or properties all human beings share.  Aristotle, for example, held that Man is 
essentially a rational animal; in other words, that rationality is an essential human 
trait and that no physical property, other than being an animal, is.  Being shorter 
than ten feet tall would therefore not be essential for being human even if, as a 
matter of fact, no human being has ever exceeded ten feet in height, and none 
ever will.  Being shorter than ten feet is only an accidental property in the sense 
that a rational animal taller than ten feet, if one existed, would still count as a 
human being.  On the other hand, an animal without rationality could never 
count as human.  An essence, then, is a set of conditions necessary and sufficient 
for being what one is.  Aristotle’s claim that Man is a rational animal is a claim 
about the human essence or, what comes to the same thing, about necessary and 
sufficient for being human.
 The Young Hegelians’ metaphysical essentialism is of a piece with this 
contention.  There is therefore nothing original or even unusual in their claim. 
What is original and unusual was their account of what the human essence is. 
Also unusual, and thoroughly non-Aristotelian, was their insistence that this 
essence is somehow the answer to all philosophical questions.  There is, however, a 
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precedent even for this rather implausible view within classical (Kantian and post-
Kantian) German philosophy; indeed, within Kant’s own work.  In The Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant famously proclaimed that “What can I know?” “What ought 
I to do?” and “What can I hope?” are the fundamental philosophical questions.2 
In a later work, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), he went on to 
suggest that, in the final analysis, these three questions reduce to one:  “What 
is Man?”  However, Kant never expressly defended this assertion nor did he 
work out its implications.  These too were tasks Feuerbach and the other Young 
Hegelians took upon themselves.
 Notwithstanding their self-identified Hegelianism, the Young Hegelian 
reduction program was fundamentally Kantian.  Young Hegelian “criticism” was 
methodologically innovative, but it was still criticism in the sense of Kant’s three 
Critiques.3  Kantian criticism aimed to establish “the conditions for the possibility” 
of one or another form of experience.  As philosophical anthropologists, the 
Young Hegelians maintained that it is ultimately essential humanity that makes 
the heterogeneous ways that experience presents itself possible.  Their aim in 
doing philosophy, or rather criticism, was to establish this fundamental truth, 
drawing out its consequences, by laying bare the human meanings experience 
expresses “through a glass darkly,” as their Right Hegelian antagonists might put 
it.
 In effect, then, their philosophical anthropology was a general theory of 
everything; an account of what everything ultimately means.  That meaning is 
always and everywhere the same.  This is so because, in the end, everything means 
the same thing — everything has a human meaning.  Thus there is ultimately only 
one real thing.  This was Hegel’s view too.  But, for Hegel, the one real thing 
was Spirit (Geist) becoming conscious of itself; for the Young Hegelians, it was 
Man becoming what He essentially is.  In both cases, essential unity is recovered 
through a process of becoming.  Philosophy’s goal is to comprehend this process 
and to carry it forward.
 To execute the critical program — specifically, to reduce Right Hegelian theology 
to philosophical anthropology — it is necessary, of course, that the philosophical 
anthropology be available.  The Essence of Christianity was Young Hegelianism’s 
seminal work because it constructed that anthropology, at the same time that it 
reduced Christianity to it.
 Because everything means the same thing, criticism of any aspect of human 
experience leads in principle to the same result.  The essence of Christianity is 
the human essence, but the human essence is the essence of everything else as 
well.  However, the Young Hegelians insisted that the critical program could not 
have begun anywhere other than where it did, with a critique of Right Hegelian 
theology.  This is because the God idea, which finds its most developed expression 
in the theology Feuerbach “interpreted,” designates an “object” that is entirely 
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immaterial and therefore utterly unreal.  It is nothing but a chimera, a representation, 
in inverted (or “alienated”) form, of essential humanity.  The truth about Man is 
embodied in it as it is in everything else; but everywhere else human meanings 
are less transparent — and therefore, in the absence of a developed philosophical 
anthropology, less accessible — because they are embodied in real things.  Were 
the philosophical anthropology at hand, material admixtures would be less likely 
to throw “critical critics” off track.  But, insofar as the task is to still to get the 
anthropology right by discovering what the human essence is — to construct the 
theory to which everything else can be reduced — empirical admixtures are likely 
to mislead.  Human beings “objectify” their essence in all and sundry, but only 
when they do so in  God is their objectification perspicuous enough to serve 
Feuerbach’s purpose.  This is why criticism of Christianity is the Royal Road to 
the philosophical anthropology the Young Hegelians aimed to discover.
 It is therefore also the key to philosophy’s next and final stage.  After the 
criticism of religion (Christianity) is complete, the critical program can then be 
applied to other aspects of human experience — including matters of expressly 
political and economic concern.  Then, as Marx proclaimed, “the arm of 
criticism” will pass into “the criticism of arms” — in other words, the “revolution” 
in philosophy registered in Hegel’s solution to the problems Kant raised will 
culminate in a social revolution, propelling humankind, the real subject of all 
philosophy, into the realm of Freedom.
  * * *
 Thus the Young Hegelians were motivated not only by theoretical exigencies 
immanent in classical German philosophy, but also by political concerns that 
they cared about even more.  These motivations flowed together to produce an 
atheism of an unprecedented kind.
 In the Young Hegelians’ time, a confluence of circumstances made Christianity 
an especially potent obstacle to progressive social and political change in Prussia 
and other German lands.  Feuerbach and the others were revolutionaries, living 
amidst a people whose aspirations for freedom were suppressed by their own 
theistic beliefs, and by the ecclesiastical institutions that sustained them.  Like 
their counterparts in pre-Revolutionary France, the Young Hegelians were 
therefore anti-clerical; like most materialists, they were atheists.  But their attitude 
towards the theism of their compatriots was not dismissive in the manner of their 
eighteenth century predecessors or the “village atheist” of American lore.  Unlike 
them, the Young Hegelians were sensitive to the ways religiosity addresses the 
deepest concerns of persons in its thrall.  They saw no need to demonstrate the 
falsity of Christian or other religious beliefs; that work had already been done. 
They were more interested in addressing the puzzle of theism’s persistence.  To 
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this end, they set out to show how theistic beliefs, though manifestly false, express 
fundamental human truths.
 Like the Right Hegelians, Feuerbach made much of Christianity’s affective 
side.  He was, after all, a product of a Romantic age and a Protestant culture 
and therefore no foe of inwardness, enchantment, reverence and awe.  He and 
the other Young Hegelians  rejected the heartless, mechanistic world-view of 
eighteenth century materialism.  But Feuerbach never doubted that faith in the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob — or in the God that Jewish, Christian and 
Muslim philosophers defend in the name of that God — is bad faith.  However, 
as a Hegelian, he also believed that a good faith, one that overcomes the bad not 
by rejecting it but by incorporating it into a “higher unity,” is possible too.  In a 
good faith, God or gods would have no role, but what these ideas simultaneously 
express and obscure about essential humanity would.  This is because, in the 
end, theism is not about God or gods; it is about Man (sic).  Its claims therefore 
express human truths; truths that, to their detriment, both theists and their 
opponents, village atheists, miss.
 Feuerbach thought that taking consciousness of these truths, not just 
cognitively but affectively as well, is emancipatory and, for that reason, politically 
portentous.  To make it known that God is Man — that Man makes God, not 
vice versa — can help turn masses of former believers into agents of revolutionary 
change.  This, in turn, advances the “end” (telos) of history in the Hegelian scheme, 
the earthly realization of the Idea of Freedom.
 As remarked, “irreligious criticism” is indispensable for the critical program 
to be applied in non-religious domains.  Whatever their interests or concerns, 
the Young Hegelians were therefore obliged to focus on religion, at least in the 
beginning.  But, unlike Feuerbach, most of them were not much interested in 
religion for its own sake.  Marx was hardly typical in this respect or any other, but 
his example is illustrative; he always had more important things to think about 
than God.  In his mid-twenties, Marx broke with Young Hegelianism altogether; 
as he wrote in the long section on Feuerbach in The German Ideology, written 
in 1845 but published posthumously, he “settled accounts with his erstwhile 
philosophical conscience.”  But even when he was still effectively Feuerbach’s 
disciple, he had little to say about religion per se.  When Marx was no longer a 
Young Hegelian, he said even less.
 However, what he did say in his Feuerbachian period is widely known 
and nearly as widely misunderstood: religion, Marx proclaimed, is “the opium 
of he people.”  Marx wrote these words at the beginning of a reflection on 
Young Hegelianism’s role in the years immediately ahead, years preceding the 
revolutionary upheavals that finally erupted — and failed — in 1848.  His remark 
was made in the context of contemplating criticism’s next phase.  Marx had no 
interest in correcting or revising Feuerbach’s reconstruction of Christian beliefs, 
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or in dwelling on his account of Christianity’s essence.  In his view, Feuerbach 
had gotten Christianity right.  What Marx wanted to do instead was to apply 
Feuerbach’s methods and results to other forms of experience — specifically, to 
the developments in ethics and politics registered in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 
and to the world described in the emerging “science” of political economy.
 After breaking with Feuerbach, Marx turned his attentions elsewhere — to 
the this-worldly investigation of “the laws of motion” of capitalist societies and 
to aspects of world history generally.  This was a momentous change of focus, 
undertaken, in part, because he had come to the conclusion that irreligious criticism 
was no longer as politically consequential as it had been, or had seemed to be, 
a few years earlier.  Other Young Hegelians went their own ways too.  Thus the 
“moment” of Feuerbachian criticism passed.  Even before 1848, the movement 
had effectively ceased to exist.
 What ended was a stage in the history of atheism that atheists subsequently, 
nowadays especially, foolishly ignore.  That it came into being at all is quite 
remarkable.  In their time and place, it must have required considerable discipline 
on the Young Hegelians’ part to resist lapsing into a dismissive atheism.  Right 
Hegelianism was the bulwark upon which defenders of the status quo staked 
their case.  It was a “discourse” of oppression.  How tempting it must therefore 
have been to disparage theism, and to leave the matter at that!  How difficult 
to empathize with those who took theistic beliefs and practices to heart!  But 
empathize is what the Young Hegelians did.  For them, the “opium of the people” 
was not just a narcotizing drug administered by cynical ruling classes to lull the 
masses into submission.  It was that too, of course.  The Young Hegelians knew 
as well as anyone that, throughout history, elites have used religion for their own 
ends.  But, as Marx insisted, religion is also an “expression of real suffering and 
a protest against real suffering…the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world…the spirit of spiritless conditions.”  How difficult it must have 
been for precocious and enthusiastic heirs of enlightened thought to assume an 
attitude consistent with these words when they knew beyond doubt that there is 
no defensible reason to believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God!
 By their time, this eighteenth century discovery — or rediscovery of what 
was already well understood in antiquity — may already have seemed stale in 
advanced intellectual circles in France.  However, even in France, outside the 
most enlightened quarters, theism still flourished, just as it did everywhere 
else.  The Young Hegelians were very cognizant of the fact that Germany was 
“backwards” in relation to France.  But its backwardness was actually an asset in 
their view because it raised the prospect of leaping over what enlightened French 
thinkers had accomplished decades earlier.  In most German lands, atheism was 
officially repressed, and freedom of religion, like other liberal rights, was more 
an aspiration than a reality.  A political revolution like the one in France would 
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change that.  But the Young Hegelians envisioned a German revolution more 
far-reaching than the French Revolution had been — one that would transform 
not only the state but civil society as well.  They were confident that their work 
would insure that revolution’s coming; that full human emancipation, not just 
equal citizenship and liberal rights, would become inevitable once irreligious 
criticism took hold of the consciousness of German believers.
 Theirs was an extreme version of a common conceit.  It seemed plain to the 
Young Hegelians, as it then still did to enlightened thinkers everywhere, that it is 
only necessary to spread the word — as it were, to make the death of God known 
— for bad faith to disappear.  Well into the twentieth century, this remained a 
widespread view.  The political left was especially wedded to it.  Many liberals 
believed it.  For most nineteenth century socialists and anarchists, it was, as it 
were, an “article of faith.”  Of course, they all knew that the way forward would 
be neither easy nor direct.  Elites would continue to use religion to control their 
subordinates, and clerisies would never relinquish their wealth and power without 
a struggle.  But, in the end, light would triumph over darkness.  Within a few 
generations at most, religion would become a relic of a benighted past.
 This was and still is a reasonable expectation for those who believe in the 
power of reason to sway the human mind.  However, during the past century 
and a half, confidence in theism’s imminent demise has become increasingly 
difficult to sustain.  The religions enlightened thinkers inveighed against should 
no longer matter politically; by now, they should no longer even exist.  But they 
do exist and they do matter.  This is not only true in the Islamic world where 
a variety of circumstances, including the machinations of imperialist powers in 
search of allies in battles with secular nationalists, nurtured a “political Islam” of 
explosive force.  It is the case nearly everywhere.  We are today, again, in a Young 
Hegelian moment — a time when religion is, more than usually, an obstacle in 
the way of human progress.  Yet again, the time is ripe for a Young Hegelian 
response.
  * * *
 The Young Hegelians’ ways of arguing and their mix of Hegelian and 
materialist metaphysics have not aged well.  This is why their writings today seem 
both exotic and obscurantist.  But this was already the case decades ago when 
the authority of the young Marx, still Feuerbach’s disciple, was invoked by those 
who would “humanize” Marxism.  When “Marxist humanism” waned, neither 
its methods nor its metaphysics were to blame.  It was the ambient political 
culture that caused interest in Young Hegelianism to subside.  This is not to say 
that we can or should take up where the Young Hegelians left off; only that the 
animating spirit of Young Hegelian criticism survived in a political and intellectual 
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environment more similar to ours than to the one in which the movement arose 
and briefly flourished.  Much has changed in recent decades, especially on the 
political front, but I would venture that it can do so again.
 As interest in Marxism and therefore Young Hegelianism diminished, the 
idea took hold that, as Margaret Thatcher put it, “there is no alternative” (TINA). 
Thatcher intended her remark to apply to the neo-liberal, anti-union and anti-
welfare state policies she advocated.  However, proponents of TINAist thinking 
succeeded, unwittingly perhaps but effectively, in establishing the idea that the 
form of civilization that contemporary capitalism sustains, its religious component 
included, is unavoidable and permanent.  This sensibility is still widespread.  The 
conventional wisdom is that what did in revolutionary programs like the Young 
Hegelians’ was utopianism or, more precisely, unwarranted optimism about 
the prospects for changing life fundamentally for the better.  Divergences from 
contemporary intellectual styles do account, in part, for the lack of interest today 
in early and mid- nineteenth century revolutionary thought.  But they are of 
much less consequence in the larger political culture than the attitudes TINAist 
thinking encourages.
 This is not the place to inveigh against TINAism in general.  My contention, 
again, is that, with respect to religion, Young Hegelian optimism is not utopian 
at all — that theism can and should be superseded, not just refuted.  However, 
TINAism is not without merit because it forces attention upon a potentially 
disabling problem that the Young Hegelians radically underestimated.  Feuerbach 
and the others were wrong in their view of the difficulties in the way of putting 
Reason in control.
 Like other enlightened thinkers of their time, the Young Hegelians failed to 
recognize the extent to which human beings resist rational persuasion, especially 
in matters of faith.  It is as if religious convictions enjoy special immunities that 
shield them from rational confutation.  This is potentially an embarrassment 
to enlightened thought.  But insofar as human recalcitrance can be accounted 
for in ways that accord with enlightened norms, embarrassment can be avoided. 
Feuerbach was only one of many thinkers who have much to tell us about the 
obstacles in Reason’s way where God is concerned.  Many of those thinkers come 
from intellectual traditions opposed to Hegelian thought.  Indeed, it would be 
fair to say that a common thread running throughout enlightened thinking in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was precisely to account for theism’s 
persistence in the face of its manifest untenability.  In this endeavor, the Young 
Hegelians were on target.  But, unlike many who would come after them, they 
radically underestimated the difficulties in the way of hitting the mark.  Theistic 
convictions are harder to exorcise than they imagined.  The humanistic “faith” 
they promoted — consistent with Reason and centered on human beings rather 
than on God or gods — is, if anything, even more difficult to realize and sustain.
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environment more similar to ours than to the one in which the movement arose 
and briefly flourished.  Much has changed in recent decades, especially on the 
political front, but I would venture that it can do so again.
 As interest in Marxism and therefore Young Hegelianism diminished, the 
idea took hold that, as Margaret Thatcher put it, “there is no alternative” (TINA). 
Thatcher intended her remark to apply to the neo-liberal, anti-union and anti-
welfare state policies she advocated.  However, proponents of TINAist thinking 
succeeded, unwittingly perhaps but effectively, in establishing the idea that the 
form of civilization that contemporary capitalism sustains, its religious component 
included, is unavoidable and permanent.  This sensibility is still widespread. 
The conventional wisdom is that what did in revolutionary programs, like the 
Young Hegelians’, was utopianism or, more precisely, unwarranted optimism 
about the prospects for changing life fundamentally for the better.  Divergences 
from contemporary intellectual styles do account, in part, for the lack of interest 
today in early and mid- nineteenth century revolutionary thought.  But they are of 
much less consequence in the larger political culture than the attitudes TINAist 
thinking encourages.
 This is not the place to inveigh against TINAism in general.  My contention, 
again, is that, with respect to religion, Young Hegelian optimism is not utopian 
at all — that theism can and should be superseded, not just refuted.  However, 
TINAism is not without merit because it forces attention upon a potentially 
disabling problem that the Young Hegelians radically underestimated.  Feuerbach 
and the others were wrong in their view of the difficulties in the way of putting 
Reason in control.
 Like other enlightened thinkers of their time, the Young Hegelians failed to 
recognize the extent to which human beings resist rational persuasion, especially 
in matters of faith.  It is as if religious convictions enjoy special immunities that 
shield them from rational confutation.  This is potentially an embarrassment 
to enlightened thought.  But insofar as human recalcitrance can be accounted 
for in ways that accord with enlightened norms, embarrassment can be avoided. 
Feuerbach was only one of many thinkers who have much to tell us about the 
obstacles in Reason’s way where God is concerned.  Many of those thinkers come 
from intellectual traditions opposed to Hegelian thought.  Indeed, it would be 
fair to say that a common thread running throughout enlightened thinking in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was precisely to account for theism’s 
persistence in the face of its manifest untenability.  In this endeavor, the Young 
Hegelians were on target.  But, unlike many who would come after them, they 
radically underestimated the difficulties in the way of hitting the mark.  Theistic 
convictions are harder to exorcise than they imagined.  The humanistic “faith” 
they promoted — consistent with Reason and centered on human beings rather 
than on God or gods — is, if anything, even more difficult to realize and sustain.
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 Because they believed that a social and political revolution was imminent, 
the Young Hegelians had no time for that “pessimism of the intellect” that 
Antonio Gramsci recommended along with “optimism of the will.”4  They all 
but claimed that seeing the world aright, seeing the human reality that religion 
inverts, will lead, in short order, to the revolutionary overthrow of the world that 
makes religion, the “opium of the people,” both possible and necessary.  They 
soon discovered that they were wrong.  However they were not wrong in thinking 
that “taking consciousness” — facing reality — is a condition for changing life for 
the better.  Their error was to conflate this single facet of a larger emancipatory 
project into a full-fledged, stand alone strategic program.  To reconstruct and 
restore the Young Hegelians’ still timely idea, it is not enough to focus only on 
what Reason requires.  The factors that make it difficult for Reason to prevail 
must also be taken into account.
  * * *
 “Militant” atheism was often the norm in Communist countries, where the 
coercive power of the state was deployed to discourage and sometimes repress 
religious practices and beliefs.  Realizing that theirs was a lost cause, at least in 
the short run, the Communists were seldom rigorous or thoroughgoing in their 
efforts to excise faith; but they did try.  Marxists out of power could only endeavor 
to persuade believers to come to their senses; they could hardly force them.  In 
time, though, Marxists, including Communists, sought to make common cause 
with believers — especially in countries where there were strong Catholic political 
parties that advocated social and economic reforms.  Thus, by the middle of 
the twentieth century, Marxist positions on religion verged on liberalism — in 
practice and, increasingly too, in theory.  The histories of liberalism and of 
religious toleration are intertwined.  Nevertheless, many liberals, especially in 
the nineteenth century, agreed with the goals militant atheists advanced; they 
were atheists themselves, and they wanted theism to disappear.  Their quarrel 
was with the militants’ means, which they considered inadmissible or ineffective 
or both.
 The Young Hegelians only discussed religious toleration in the course of 
faulting revolutionary endeavors that were insufficiently radical because they 
envisioned nothing beyond the liberal and democratic horizons of revolutionaries 
fifty years earlier.  They saw no need.  They thought that making the human 
meaning of theistic concepts known would vanquish religion altogether.  They 
therefore had nothing to say about how to deal with people who resist their 
explanations.  But had the movement survived long enough for the Young 
Hegelians to have had to confront the issue, they would probably have opposed 
militant atheism  — not exactly on liberal grounds but because politically organized 
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efforts to suppress faith are at odds with the spirit of Young Hegelian criticism. 
What Feuerbach contrived was an explanatory program intended to help people 
free themselves from ways of thinking that oppress them.  It envisioned mass 
self-emancipation; not repression.  An atheism that retrieves what is still living 
in the Young Hegelians’ purchase on faith would follow suit.
 Many Young Hegelians had been liberals before they moved on to more 
radical positions, many of them continued to evince respect for liberal values. 
In the liberal view, it is morally indefensible to repress beliefs, and it is wrong 
to repress practices that do no harm to others.  There are many ways to defend 
this position.  Perhaps the most convincing, and also the one most connected 
historically and conceptually with the Young Hegelian movement, draws on 
Kant’s moral philosophy.  On this view, it is wrong to interfere with expressions 
of private conscience, and also with harmless behaviors directed at others, because 
doing so violates the principle of morality, epitomized in a formulation of Kant’s, 
according to which persons ought never to be treated merely as means but should 
instead be accorded the respect due to “ends-in-themselves.”  Repressing religion 
falls afoul of this requirement insofar as religious practices harm no one directly, 
and insofar as religious commitments are among the core values that constitute 
individuals’ conceptions of themselves.5  To proscribe or enforce beliefs that 
play this role is therefore to fail to respect human “dignity” in the way morality 
requires.
 Contemporary liberals characteristically join this defense of tolerance with 
an implicitly TINAist disposition to think that religion will always be with us. 
They believe, in other words, that, under free (non-coercive) conditions, theism 
will survive for an indefinite period, and therefore that religious convictions will 
merit unqualified respect for just as long.  The Young Hegelians had a different 
view.  They thought that because theism’s appeal is meretricious, it merits no 
respect.  Even unqualified acceptance of the case for treating moral personality 
in oneself and others as an end-in-itself does not mitigate this fact.  Respect 
for persons can never underwrite acquiescence in their irrationality, especially 
when their beliefs and practices have debilitating — counter-emancipatory — 
consequences.  What the respect Kant enjoined necessitates is encouragement 
of enlightenment in oneself and others.  It commands “taking consciousness” 
of the real, not acquiescing in erroneous representations of it.
  * * *
 If the Communist experience shows anything, it is that the battle against 
theism cannot be waged successfully at the level of institutions, policies and laws 
alone.  This conclusion is consistent with Young Hegelian thinking; so is the idea 
that, for mitigating and eventually eliminating the harms the Abrahamic religions 
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do, cultural and psychological factors matter more than rationally compelling 
arguments.  Ironically, in these matters, there really are no alternatives.  Coercion 
cannot suppress theism indefinitely, and liberal “respect” does not even aim at 
freeing humanity from religion’s thrall.  Only a protracted struggle in and over 
the ambient intellectual culture can, in time, render the Abrahamic religions 
as politically inert as, say, the wiser, but similarly meretricious polytheisms they 
replaced.6
 Theism cannot be repressed into oblivion.  However, under ideal conditions, it 
can and probably will wither away on its own.  Because they believed this fervently, 
the Young Hegelians were not exactly liberals with respect to religious liberty, 
though there is little doubt that, had they been forced to take a position, they 
would have defended freedom of religion as ardently as any liberal.  They would 
have been right to do so — not only because it is wrong to coerce right thinking, 
as liberals also believe (for other reasons), but also because it will not work.  For 
those who would have societies overcome their pasts by turning to enlightened 
irreligion, liberalism is more efficacious than militant atheism.  It is also more 
congenial to the Young Hegelian conviction that enlightenment is an individual 
achievement, not a policy authorities can legislate.  Liberals agree.  But there is a 
difference: for liberal atheists, atheism is a cause to plead within a framework of 
political institutions that takes no side; indeed, that encourages a plurality of sides. 
As liberals, liberal atheists value religious pluralism.  The Young Hegelians had 
no time for it.  Their aim was to hasten the day when an enlightened citizenry, 
comprised of persons free from the “self-imposed nonage” that has held humanity 
back for so long, forsake religion definitively and irreversibly.
 With their pretensions to exclusivity and universality, monotheistic religions 
promote discord and strife.  Polytheistic religions are more tolerant.  In a famous 
passage from The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edmund Gibbon, speaking 
of the time when imperial Roman institutions flourished, observed that “the 
various modes of worship that prevailed in the Roman world were all considered 
by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the 
magistrate as equally useful.”7  Thus there was a kind of “religious concord,” as 
Gibbon put it.  On Gibbon’s account, monotheistic Judaism in distant Palestine 
was the exception; it was intolerant of paganism and its rituals.  Even before it 
became an official religion of the Roman Empire, Christianity universalized the 
intolerance of its ancestor faith.  It maintained that its God was the only God, 
and that outside its Church, there was no salvation.  In this way, what began as 
an exceptional phenomenon in a remote Roman province spread throughout the 
Roman Empire, upsetting the benign and tolerant world of classical antiquity. 
Abetted by Islam, a later Abrahamic religion that took much from the other two, 
intolerance persists to this day.
 There is no turning back to pagan ways, nor should there be.  But neither 
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should we deny the fact that, in many respects, the transition from polytheism 
to monotheism was a step backwards.  Because the winners write the history, 
it is almost universally assumed that civilization advanced when monotheism 
replaced polytheism.  The Young Hegelians believed this; indeed, their version 
of the consensus view was extreme.  Following Hegel, they held that the religious 
convictions of contemporaneous German Protestants, represented in the doctrines 
of their Right Hegelian rivals, were the most advanced — and therefore the most 
revealing — in all of human history.  In this case, as in others, they were misled 
by their underlying philosophical assumptions, just as less philosophically self-
conscious proponents of the conventional wisdom are misled by theirs.  For the 
fact remains: Gibbon was right — Graeco-Roman polytheism was less pernicious 
than the Abrahamic faiths that succeeded it.  Of course, the founders of these 
faiths and their successors were also right in holding that polytheistic beliefs are 
not worthy of serious consideration.  Unfortunately, it took just a few centuries 
shy of two millennia for a comparable judgment to be leveled against their own 
monotheism.  More unfortunately, that incontrovertible judgment remains a 
minority view to this day.
 In the modern period, liberalism provides a functional equivalent for 
Graeco-Roman tolerance — by turning religious convictions into matters of 
private conscience and insisting that they be of no political consequence. 
I would suggest, though, that liberal religion is not a viable option in the long 
run and not a desirable or even cogent option now.  Liberal religion is not so 
much a new, distinctively modern form of faith, as a diminution of the old form. 
As such, it is a (painfully slow) vehicle of exit for a civilization that has outgrown 
theism but that, for trenchant human reasons, finds itself unable unequivocally 
to shake off its yoke.
 Gibbon was a creature of the Scottish Enlightenment.  He had co-thinkers 
throughout Europe, especially in France and among European colonials in the 
Americas.  Many of his co-thinkers were liberals.  Others looked forward to the 
passing away of theistic beliefs altogether, not just their relegation to a politically 
inconsequential private sphere.  Their solution to the problem liberalism addressed 
by privatizing faith was to remove the very possibility of religious discord at its 
source.  They envisioned a world in which the Abrahamic religions and therefore 
the politics they helped shape was only an historical memory, in much the way 
that paganism now is.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, socialists 
and anarchists were the main proponents of this enlightened eighteenth century 
objective.  But then the militant atheism of official Communism brought discredit 
on their project.  This is one reason why, in recent decades, “faith” in a secular 
future has lapsed even in what remains of the socialist and anarchist traditions; 
and why, in many circumstances, the religious Left is at the core of resistance to 
the status quo.  Generations ago, this would not have seemed possible.  For the 
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Young Hegelians, it would have been inconceivable.
 But humankind will not succeed in building a future worthy of human beings, 
a future of the sort the Young Hegelians envisioned, until the forces of progress 
become resolutely irreligious again, and until good faith, faith in humanity and 
its future, supersedes the bad faith that theistic religions promote.  To this end, 
it is vital to expose not just the untenability of theistic convictions but also the 
harm they do.  This is a Sisyphean task in which it is not enough to win every 
(intellectual) battle.  Still, these battles must be fought and (re)won, however many 
times it takes, until humanity is able again to move on — this time without any 
semblance of turning back.
  * * *
 The Young Hegelians saw “irreligious criticism” as a decisive step in the 
struggle to realize liberty, equality and fraternity in the conditions of their time 
and place.  We now know that the larger struggle is more difficult than they and 
their contemporaries in the revolutionary camp of early and mid nineteenth 
century Germany imagined, and that it too has a has a Sisyphean aspect.  The 
Young Hegelians overestimated the importance of the “irreligious criticism” they 
developed, just as they underestimated the difficulties in the way of winning that 
larger struggle.  They succumbed to what might be called the rationalistic fallacy 
— the assumption that rationally compelling arguments automatically win the 
day.  As we again rise to the challenge of confronting the evils of religiosity in 
our time, we must guard against this mistake.  It is disconcerting to think that 
debates that were concluded long ago must be resumed, and that it is as urgent 
as ever to battle against a social, political and psychological phenomenon, or 
family of phenomena, that ought to have faded from the scene long ago.  But, 
for reasons we must endeavor to understand, this is the situation we confront.
  University of Maryland
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